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Over the past few years, there has been a steadily increasing interest on the part of economists
in happiness research. For a long time it has been the province of psychology.
2 Most recently,
this psychological research has been linked to economics (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin
1997, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2000). General interest in the measurement and
the determinants of subjective reported well-being has been raised by a symposium (Frank
1997, Ng 1997, Oswald 1997). The pathbreaking contribution by Easterlin (1974) was noted
by many economics scholars but at the time found few followers. Since the late 1990s,
economists have started to contribute large scale empirical analyses of the determinants of
happiness in different countries and periods as well as in panel studies (for example Alesina,
Di Tella and MacCulloch 2000, Blanchflower and Oswald 2000, Di Tella, MacCulloch and
Oswald 2001, Frey and Stutzer 1999, 2000).
We argue that happiness research is able to contribute important insights for economics which
so far have been treated lightly or have been totally neglected. Some of the results clearly
contradict the standard assumptions of economics as used in most models, but others support
the conventional economic views. This paper does not intend to provide a general survey on
happiness research (which is provided in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz 1999, Lane 2000,
and Frey and Stutzer 2001). Rather, we wish to show which insights may be important, if not
necessary, to integrate into economics.
Section 2 discusses the relationship between happiness and utility. It is argued that reported
subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility. Sections
3 to 5 report how the economic variables income, unemployment and inflation affect
happiness. Section 6 shows that, in addition to current economic conditions, institutional
factors, in particular the type of democracy and the extent of government decentralization,
also systematically influence how satisfied individuals are with their life. The last section 7
discusses the consequences for economic policy and for economic theory.
2  Happiness and Utility
“For most people, happiness is the main, if not the only, ultimate objective of life“ (Ng 1996:
1). And so, in the end, economics is about individual happiness. Happiness, or subjective
well-being, can be measured by representative surveys.
Nevertheless, standard economic theory employs an “objectivist” position based on
observable choices made by individuals. Individual utility only depends on tangible factors
(goods and services), is inferred from revealed behavior (or preferences), and is in turn used
to explain the choices made. This “modern“ view of utility has been influenced by the
positivistic movement in philosophy. Subjectivist experience (e.g. captured by surveys) is
                                                
2 See for example Argyle (1987), Diener, Suh, Lucas and Smith (1999), Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz (1999),
Michalos (1991), Myers (1993), Ryan and Deci (2000), Strack, Argyle and Schwarz (1991). There are also
contributions by sociologists, in particular Veenhoven (for example 1993), and political scientists
(Inglehart 1990, Lane 2000).3
rejected as being „unscientific“, because it is not objectively observable and is not necessary
for economic theory (Robbins 1932, Hicks 1934, Allen 1934). It is assumed that the choices
made provide all the information required to infer the utility of outcomes. Moreover, the
axiomatic revealed preference approach is not only applied to derive individual utility, but
also to measure social welfare. To do so, social welfare comparison is based on the
consumption behavior of households.
The positivistic view is still dominant in economics. Sen (1986: 18) observes that “the
popularity of this view in economics may be due to a mixture of an obsessive concern with
observability and a peculiar belief that choice [...] is the only human aspect that can be
observed“. Its dominance is reflected in the contents of microeconomic textbooks. However,
not all contemporary economists subscribe to this view. Numerous scholars have challenged
standard economic theory from different angles.
!  There are numerous examples for non-objectivist theoretical analyses in economics. They
incorporate emotions (e.g. Elster 1998), such as regret (e.g. Bell 1982, Loomes and
Sugden 1982), self-signaling (self-esteem), goal completion, mastery and meaning
(Loewenstein 1999) or status (e.g. Frank 1985a), as well as even broader considerations
beyond the normal use of utility (e.g. Sen's 1982  „entitlements“).
!  Standard theory assumes independent utilities, although interdependent utilities often fit
particular observed behavior better (e.g. Clark and Oswald 1998). More important,
interdependent utilities question traditional welfare propositions (e.g. Boskin and
Sheshinski 1978, Holländer 2001, Layard 1980).
!  By focussing on the value of outcomes rather than on observed decisions, various types of
utility can usefully be distinguished (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997). Predicted
utility “refers to beliefs about the experienced utility of outcomes”; remembered utility “is
inferred from a subject’s retrospective reports on the total pleasure or displeasure
associated with past outcomes”, and instant utility measures “hedonic and affective
experience, which can be derived from immediate reports of current subjective experience
or from physiological indices” (pp. 376f). Thus experiences are counted three times due to
the effect of anticipation and memory on current utility (see Elster and Loewenstein
1992). These hedonistic concepts are based on an old tradition. The initiators of the
modern analysis of decision-making (Bernoulli 1738 and Bentham 1789) indeed
understood utility as satisfaction, referring to the hedonic quality in terms of the pleasure
and pain of current experience as well as of memory, imagination and expectations.
!  Subjective experience is a valuable source of information about individual utility. Choices
are not always rational (in the sense of consistency), an insight which has been integrated
into economics in the literature on anomalies in decision-making (e.g. Thaler 1992). It is
therefore questionable whether utility can generally be derived from observed choices.
!  Consequentialism, of which utilitarianism is a special case, is not the only aspect relevant
for behavior, but procedural utility should also be considered (Sen 1995, 1997, Le
Menestrel 2001).4
The exclusive reliance on an objectivist approach by standard economic theory is thus open to
doubt, both theoretically and empirically. In any case, it restricts the possibility of
understanding and influencing human well-being.
Directly measurable subjective happiness is a promising complement to derived “objective”
decision utility (as commonly used in economics). Measures of subjective well-being can
serve as proxies for “utility”. They are captured in surveys on individuals’ happiness or life
satisfaction. It is a sensible tradition in economics to rely on the judgement of the persons
directly involved. Therefore, people are reckoned to be the best judges of the overall quality
of their life, and it is a straightforward strategy to ask them about their well-being. With the
help of a single question or several questions on global self-reports, it is possible to get
indications of individuals′  evaluation of their life satisfaction or happiness. Behind the score
indicated by a person is a cognitive assessment to what degree the overall quality of life is
judged in a favorable way (Veenhoven 1993). People evaluate their level of subjective well-
being with regard to circumstances and comparisons to other persons, past experience and
expectations of the future.
Subjective well-being is usually investigated under the assumption that it is cardinally
measurable and interpersonally comparable; i.e. two claims that economists are likely to be
skeptical about. To avoid problems with regard to a cardinal interpretation of subjective
variables, it is often possible to treat the subjective data ordinally in econometric analyses. In
contrast, whether people associate the same degree of subjective experience with a certain
score on a ladder of life satisfaction is more difficult to assess. However, there is a lot of
indirect evidence that cardinalism and interpersonal comparability are much less of a problem
practically than theoretically. In a number of studies, the consistency and validity of survey
answers on subjective well-being have been documented. Happy people are, for example,
more often smiling during social interactions (Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda 1995) and are
rated as happy by friends and family members (Sandvik, Diener and Seidlitz 1993), as well as
by spouses (Costa and McCrae 1988). Furthermore, the measures of subjective well-being
reflect life-changes (Ehrhardt, Saris and Veenhoven 1999), persons’ recall of positive versus
negative life-events (Seidlitz, Wyer and Diener 1997), and are to a large extent unbiased with
regard to social desirability (Konow and Earley 1999). But there is, of course, room for
methodological concerns (e.g. Schwarz and Strack 1999, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001).
Nevertheless, happiness or reported subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical
approximation to individual utility, with fruitful applications in empirical economic research
from which economists should not be too shy to learn.
3  Effects of Income on Happiness
3.1  The Conventional View
Most economists take it as a matter of course that higher income leads to higher happiness.
And why should it not? A higher income expands individuals’ and countries’ opportunity set,
i.e. more goods and services can be consumed. The few people not interested in more
commodities need not consume them; they are free to costlessly dispose of any unwanted5
surplus. It therefore seems obvious that income and happiness go together (provided, of
course, that the two are correctly measured). Consequently, economics textbooks do not even
make an effort to provide a reason, but simply state that utility U is raised by income Y: U =
U(Y), with U’>O.
But there are also some economists who do not suscribe to the idea that higher income
produces higher happiness. One of them is John Kenneth Galbraith who, in his famous book
on the Affluent Society (1957), pointed out the limited use of higher private income while the
public sector is starving. The first economist to seriously study the data on happiness, Richard
Easterlin (1974), concluded that “money does not buy happiness”. Another author claiming
that the most cherished values cannot be bought on markets is Tibor Scitovsky with his
Joyless Economy, The Psychology of Human Satisfaction (1976). Scitovsky even argues that a
high level of wealth brings continuous comforts and thereby prevents the pleasure that results
from incomplete and intermittent satisfaction of desires. More recently, Robert Frank, in his
Luxury Fever (1999),  emphasizes that ever increasing income and consumption does not
bring higher happiness.
In the following, three different aspects of the relationship between income and happiness are
discussed:
!  Are persons in rich countries happier than those in poor countries? (Section 3.2),
!  Does an increase in income over time raise happiness? (Section 3.3),
!  Are persons with high income in a country happier than those with low income? (Section
3.4).
3.2  Income and Happiness between Countries
Various studies provide evidence that, on average, persons living in rich countries are happier
than those living in poor countries (for example Diener, Diener and Diener 1995, Inglehart
1990). The differences in income between the countries are measured both by using exchange
rates as well as purchasing power parities in order to control for the international differences
in the cost of living. The data on happiness are from the World Value Survey, the best source
available today for international comparisons of life satisfaction.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between average per capita income in a country (on the
horizontal axis) and average life satisfaction (on the vertical axis).
Figure 1 about here
The figure shows that reported subjective well-being indeed rises with income. Some of the
authors identify a curvilinear relationship: income provides happiness at low levels of
development but, once some kind of threshold has been passed, income has little or no effect
on happiness.6
A visual inspection of the relationship between income and happiness across countries is,
however, of limited value. The positive correlation may be produced by other factors than
income as such. In particular, countries with higher per capita incomes tend to have more
stable democracies than poor countries have. So it may well be that the seemingly observed
positive association between income and happiness is in reality due to the more developed
democratic conditions (see section 6.1 and 6.2).
In addition to democracy, there are many other conditions going with income which may
produce the observed positive correlation between income and happiness. Just to name two
more: the higher the income, the better the average health and the more equal the distribution
of income. Thus, both health and distributional equality may seemingly make happiness rise
with income.
Another aspect to consider is whether causality runs from income to well-being, as implicitly
assumed so far. An inverse causation can well be imagined (see for example Kenny 1999). It
might, for instance, be argued that the more satisfied the population is with its life, the more it
is inclined to work hard, and therefore the higher is its per capita income. Or, happy people
may be more creative and enterprising, leading again to higher income. But there is
substantial evidence that it is indeed income that causes subjective well-being. It has been
established that essentially all social indicators are more positive in nations of higher income:
in richer countries there is more and better quality food, cleaner drinking water, better and
more wide-spread education, better health services, greater longevity, more parity between the
sexes, and more respect for human rights (Easterly 1999).
The available evidence thus suggests that across nations income and happiness go together.
The notion that the people in poor countries are happier because they live under more
“natural” and less stressful conditions can be considered a myth.
3.3  Income and Happiness over Time
Several scholars (e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald 2000, Lane 1998 and Myers 2000) have
identified a striking and curious relationship: per capita income in the United States has risen
sharply in recent decades, but the proportion of persons considering themselves to be “very
happy” has fallen over the same period. Graphically, the development of income and
happiness diverges like opening scissors. Consider, for instance, figure 2.
Figure 2 about here
Between 1946 and 1991, income per capita in the United States rose from about $ 11,000 to $
27,000 in 1996 $, that is by a factor of 2.5 or by 150 percent. This is a tremendous rise in
average purchasing power. The rise was reflected in almost all households having an indoor
toilet, a washing machine, telephone and color television, as well as a car (see Easterlin 2000b
or Lebergott 1993). The figure also shows, however, that this tremendous rise in material
well-being was accompanied by a modest decrease in average happiness. In 1946, average7
happiness rated on a 3-point scale was close to 2.4. In 1991, after 45 years of affluence,
average happiness dropped to 2.2.
This result can be taken as an indication that “money does not buy happiness”, or that there is
more to subjective well-being than income. One of the most important processes is that
people adjust to past experiences.
Human beings are unable and unwilling to make absolute judgements. Rather, they are
constantly drawing comparisons from the past or from their expectations of the future. Thus,
we notice and react to deviations from aspiration levels. A rise in our income initially
provides a surge of satisfaction, but after some time we get accustomed to it and are not
happier than before.
Additional material goods and services initially provide extra pleasure, but it is usually only
transitory. Higher happiness with material things wears off. Satisfaction depends on change
and disappears with continued consumption. This process or mechanism that reduces the
hedonic effects of a constant or repeated stimulus is called adaptation. And it is this process of
hedonic adaptation that makes people strive for ever higher aspirations.
Adaptation level theory is well grounded in psychology (in particular Helson 1964, Brickman
and Campbell 1971, Parducci 1995 and, for a modern discussion, Frederick and Loewenstein
1999), as is the concept of aspiration levels (Irwin 1944). According to aspiration level
theory, happiness is determined by the gap between aspiration and achievement (Michalos
1991, Inglehart 1990, ch.7). In economics, the theories of preference change have
concentrated on habit formation (e.g. Marshall 1890, Duesenberry 1949, Modigliani 1949,
Pollack 1970 and more recently Carroll and Weil 1994).
Four important consequences follow:
(1) The upward adjustment of expectations induces human beings to accomplish more and
more. They are never satisfied. Once they have achieved something, they want to achieve
even more. The theory of “rising expectations” does not only hold for material goods and
services but also for many immaterial achievements. A promotion, for example, makes for
temporary happiness, but at the same time raises the expectation and aspiration for further
promotions.
(2) Wants are insatiable. The more one gets, the more one wants. The marginal utility of
income is thus not defined anymore in this framework as the utility function changes with
the income level.
(3) The greater opportunities provided by higher income do not always raise happiness.
Opportunities may well generate higher aspirations, therewith lowering subjective well-
being. As a result, people who are trapped in a situation are not necessarily more unhappy
than those with many opportunities.
(4) Most people think that they felt less happy in the past, but expect to be more happy in the
future (Easterlin 2000a). This asymmetry can be explained by changing aspirations, as
will be illustrated below.8
The effects of changes in income affecting aspiration levels is shown in figure 3 (see Easterlin
2000a).
Figure 3 about here
Initially, people have a certain aspiration level Al so that income Y1 produces happiness H1.
Rising income, say from Y1 to Y2, raises happiness from H1 to H2. If it rises further, say to Y3,
happiness is further increased to H3. The points a, b and c trace a curve with decreasing
marginal utility of income, as normally assumed in economic theory. This curve holds for a
particular point in time. It suggests that a higher income indeed makes people happier.
But, over time, aspiration adjusts to the higher income level. The aspiration level curve Al
shifts downward to Am. Ex post, the rise in income from Y1 to Y2 does not produce any
increase in happiness if the aspiration curve indeed shifts as much downward as assumed in
the graph. If the increase in income jacks up aspirations even higher, say to the aspiration
curve Ah, income Y2 produces even lower happiness than the lower income Y1. This
corresponds to Figure 4.1, with the average happiness level shown on the vertical axis.
Aspiration level theory suggests that increases in income and aspiration levels are closely
connected. The increase in happiness expected on the basis of a given aspiration curve – for
example along the points a, b, c on aspiration curve Al – does not materialize. Rather, an
increase in income is accompanied by a downward shift in the aspiration curve. In
equilibrium, one may, for example, observe that the sequence of points a, e, f materializes. As
the curves are drawn, higher income matches higher happiness, but an increase in income
produces a much smaller increase in happiness than with given aspiration levels.
As indicated above, the figure helps to explain the asymmetry in evaluations of happiness
referring to the past and to the future. A person with income Y3 judges his or her past
happiness on the basis of the current aspiration level Am. As income has risen, say from Y2 to
Y3, the previous income is evaluated to have produced happiness H1 at point d which is lower
than today’s happiness level H4, as given at point e. Current happiness is thus taken to be
higher than in the past. In actual fact, when the individuals actually received income Y2, they
had a lower aspiration level and therefore that income actually produced happiness H2 in the
past, which in our figure is even higher than today’s happiness H4.
Future income is also evaluated on the basis of the current aspiration level. Let’s assume a
person situated at point e with income Y3 and happiness H4. He or she anticipates that an
increase in income from Y3 to Y4 produces a well-being along curve Am, so that happiness H3
at point f is to be expected. But the person does not take into account that the aspiration level
also rises and that the aspiration curve will therefore shift downwards, say to curve Ah. In
actual fact, therefore, when the higher income Y4 is indeed reached, the level of happiness is
only H4 at point g, and not H3 as would have been the case if the aspiration level had stayed
constant at point f. The actual happiness of the increase in income is thus systematically lower
than expected beforehand (in our figure 3, happiness even stays constant).9
3.4  Income between Persons
Persons with higher income have more opportunities to achieve whatsoever they desire: they
can buy more material goods and services. Moreover they have a higher status in society.
Higher income yields higher utility, and conversely the poor are unhappy.
In contrast, the research on happiness has looked at the relationship between income and
subjective well-being in a more differentiated way. There are many reasons why income does
not buy happiness. Perhaps the most fundamental one is that it may be impossible to reach
happiness by earning and spending income. Happiness is in this sense “priceless”, i.e. cannot
be achieved by material factors.
The relationship between income and happiness at a particular point in time and location
(country) has been the subject of a large empirical literature. As a robust result, it is found that
richer people, on average, report higher subjective well-being. However, differences in
income only explain a low proportion of the differences in happiness among persons. Other
factors are thus at least as important in explaining why some people are happier than others.
The relation between income and happiness is studied for income levels as well as for
increases in income. The effect of an individual’s increase in income on happiness is carefully
analyzed in a longitudinal study using data on windfalls. It is found that lottery winners and
people receiving an inheritance reported higher mental well-being in the following year
(Gardner and Oswald 2001). For the effect of the level of income on happiness consider, for
example, the following figure 4 showing the percentage distribution of the US population in
1994 according to happiness at seven different income levels.
Figure 4 about here
The percentage of persons rating themselves to be “very happy” rises from 16 percent for
those with incomes below $ 10,000 to 44 percent for those with incomes above $ 75,000.
Conversely, the percentage of persons considering themselves to be “not too happy” falls
from 23 to 6 percent. The “mean happiness” rating rises from 1.8 for those with incomes
below $ 10,000 to 2.8 for those with incomes above $ 75,000. However, a simple correlation
between happiness and income is only 0.20.
Data for Europe from the Euro-Barometer Survey Series (1975-1991) reveal a similar picture.
There is a correlation between happiness and income but it is small in magnitude. For
example, 88 percent of those persons located in the upper quartile of the income bracket rate
themselves to be “fairly satisfied” or “very satisfied”, while 66 percent of those in the lowest
income quartile do likewise (see the data presented in Di Tella et al. 1999).
More refined regressions, taking into account a large number of factors independent of
income influencing happiness – such as age, gender, education, or health – also find a
relatively small positive effect of income on happiness. Other economic (in particular
unemployment) and non-economic (in particular health) factors exert a much greater
influence.10
What has been said so far refers to rich countries. It is undisputed that poverty makes for
unhappiness. Several scholars therefore assume that the relationship between income and
happiness is curvilinear. Figure 5 provides such a picture for the United States from 1981-84.
Figure 5 about here
For people with low levels of income, a rise in income strongly raises well-being. But once an
annual income of about US $ 15,000 has been reached, a rise in income has a much smaller
effect on happiness. Higher income is still experienced as raising well-being, but at a smaller
rate.
There may be many different reasons why higher income does not simply translate into higher
happiness. One of the most important ones without doubt is that people compare themselves
to other persons. It is not the absolute level of income that matters most but rather one’s
position relative to other persons. This idea of relative income is part of the more general
aspiration level theory. Concepts of interdependent preferences due to comparisons with
relevant others (see e.g. Becker 1974, Frank 1985b, Pollak 1976) supplement ideas focussing
on preference changes due to comparison with, for example, one’s past consumption level or
expected future income.
In economics, Easterlin (1974, 1995) used the concept of aspirations as a frame of reference
to explain happiness. He acknowledges that people with higher income are, on average,
happier, but raising the incomes of all does not increase the happiness of all, because in
comparison to others income has not improved. This interpretation of the data is supported by
laboratory findings showing the importance of relative judgements for happiness (Smith,
Diener and Wedell 1989, Tversky and Griffin 1991).
Many economists of the past have noted that individuals compare themselves to significant
others with respect to income, consumption, status or utility. Thorstein Veblen (1899) coined
the notion of “conspicuous consumption”, serving to impress other persons. The “relative
income hypothesis” has been formulated and econometrically tested by James Duesenberry
(1949), who posits an asymmetric structure of externalities. People look upwards when
making comparisons. Aspirations thus tend to be above the level reached. More wealthy
people impose a negative external effect on the poorer people, but not vice versa. As a result,
savings rates depend on the percentile position in the income distribution, and not solely on
the income level, as in a traditional savings function.
A major line of research has been opened by Bernhard van Praag and Arie Kapteyn (1973)
and associates (e.g. Kapteyn and Wansbeek 1985, van Praag and Frijters 1999). They
construct an econometrically estimated Individual Welfare Function with a “preference shift”
parameter which captures the tendency of material wants to increase as income increases.
They find that income increases shift aspirations upwards but that individual satisfaction
nevertheless increases. The preference shift “destroys” about 60-80 percent of the welfare
effect of an increase in income, so that somewhat less than a third remains.11
Fred Hirsch (1976), in his book “Social Limits to Growth”, emphasizes the role of relative
social status by calling attention to “positional goods” which, by definition, cannot be
augmented because they solely rely on not being available to others. This theme was taken up
by Robert Frank (1985, 1999) who argues that the production of positional goods in the form
of luxuries, such as exceedingly expensive watches or yachts, is a waste of productive
resources as overall happiness is thereby decreased rather than increased.
There is little doubt that people compare themselves to other people and do not use absolute
judgements. But it is crucial to know with what other persons such a comparison is being
made. In a study of 10,000 British workers, Clark and Oswald (1996) have identified the
reference group to be persons with the same job, education, gender etc. They conclude that
the lower the income of the group one compares oneself with, the more satisfied people are.
In consonance, Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) find that if the spouse, or another household
member earns more, satisfaction is lower.
All this evidence is consistent with a positive correlation between income and happiness
within a society. However, it emphasizes the relevance of the relative position in the income
distribution rather than the absolute level of income.
4  Unemployment
4.1  Conventional Views
Most economists take unemployment to be an unfortunate event to be avoided as much as
possible. To become unemployed is considered to be burdensome, and above all involuntary.
But there are also economists who hold a quite different view. Following the “new classical
macroeconomics”, unemployment is voluntary. People choose to go out of employment
because they find the burden of work and the wage paid unattractive compared to being
unemployed and getting unemployment benefits. Involuntary unemployment is a
disequilibrium phenomenon and exists only in the short run until individuals and firms have
adjusted.
The issue of whether, and to what extent, the unemployed are dissatisfied is therefore
unresolved. For that reason happiness research on unemployment is of particular importance.
In this section, two questions and their ramifications will be discussed:
!  What is the level of happiness of an unemployed person (section 4.2)?
!  How does general unemployment in an economy affect happiness (section 4.3)?
4.2  Personal Unemployment
How particular people are affected when they become unemployed needs to be analyzed with
the help of a micro-analysis which looks at individual data. Such a study (Di Tella,
MacCulloch and Oswald 2001) was undertaken for twelve European countries over the period
1975-1991, employing Euro-Barometer data. In the survey, the following life satisfaction
question is included: ”On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied12
or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”. The analysis, which controls for a great number
of other determinants of happiness, such as income and education, finds that the self-
proclaimed happiness of those persons being unemployed is much lower than employed
persons with otherwise similar characteristics. The loss of happiness experienced by
unemployment amounts to 0.33 units in the above mentioned satisfaction scale, ranging from
1 (“not at all satisfied”) to 4 (“very satisfied”).
Many other studies (see Darity and Goldsmith 1996 for a survey) have also found that, for
many different countries and time periods, personally experiencing unemployment makes
people very unhappy. In their path-breaking study for Britain, Clark and Oswald (1994: 655)
summarize their result as “joblessness depressed well-being more than any other single
characteristic including important negative ones such as divorce and separation.”
All these results refer to the “pure” effect of being unemployed. The income loss, as well as
other indirect effects which may, but need not, go with personally being unemployed, are kept
constant.
The empirical research based on estimating happiness functions contrasts strongly with the
views held by the new classical macroeconomists. For those affected, becoming unemployed
is considered to be a most unfortunate event creating unhappiness.
It could be argued that what has been found may be interpreted quite differently. While the
negative correlation between unemployment and happiness is well established, it may well be
that the causation runs in the opposite direction implied so far: unhappy people do not
perform well, and therefore are laid off. Happy persons are fitter for working life, which
makes it less likely for them to lose their job. The question of reverse causation due to a
selection bias has been analyzed in many studies with longitudinal data, before and after
particular workers lose their job, for example due to a plant closure. There is evidence that
unhappy people are indeed not performing well on the labor market, but the main causation
clearly runs from unemployment to unhappiness (see e.g. Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998
for German data, or Marks and Fleming 1999 for Australian data, the latter considering in
detail various effects on mental health).
4.3  General Unemployment
People may be unhappy about unemployment even if they are not themselves put out of work.
They may feel bad about the unfortunate fate of those unemployed and they may worry about
becoming unemployed themselves in the future. They may also feel repercussions on the
economy and society as a whole. They may dislike the increase in unemployment
contributions and taxes likely to happen in the future, they may fear that crime and social
tension increase, and they may even see the threat of violent protests and uprisings.
The study of 12 European countries over the period 1975-1991 mentioned above (Di Tella et
al. 2001) finds that – keeping all other influences constant – a one percentage point increase
in the general rate of unemployment from 9 percent (the European mean) to 10 percent
reduces stated life satisfaction by 0.028 units on the four-point scale applied. This effect is of
considerable size. This small rise in unemployment is equivalent to shifting more than 213
percent of the population downwards from one life-satisfaction category to another, for
example from “not very satisfied” to “not at all satisfied”.
The overall effect of unemployment on social well-being can be calculated by adding the loss
experienced by those persons being unemployed to the overall effect of unemployment.
Consider again a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment. In section 2, it was shown
that the unemployed experience a fall of 0.33 in their happiness scale. This figure must be
multiplied by the one percent of the population who have been unlucky enough actually to
become unemployed: 0.33 x 0.01 = 0.0033. Added to the general effect of a one percentage
point unemployment increase of 0.028, it leads to a total decrease of 0.0313 (Di Tella et al.
2001).
This calculation must be taken with a grain of salt. It is at best able to gauge the effects of
unemployment on happiness in an approximate way. One reason for having to be careful is
that there may be various interactions between personal and more general unemployment,
which may in turn affect the evaluation of happiness.
An important interaction refers to reference groups. As is the case for income, individuals
tend to evaluate their own situation relative to other persons. For most persons,
unemployment lowers their happiness less if they are not alone with this particular fate. When
unemployment is seen to hit many persons one knows or hears of, both the psychic and the
social effects are mitigated. Self esteem is better preserved because it becomes obvious that
being out of a job is less due to one’s own fault and more due to general developments in the
economy. Stigma and social disapproval are less prevalent if unemployment hits many other
persons at the same time.
In order to empirically test the effect of reference groups on reported well-being, happiness
scores are regressed on three types of explanatory variables:
!  personal unemployment,
!  unemployment among a reference group, and
!  an interaction variable combining personal and reference group unemployment,
Using as a reference group the employment state of one’s partner or, alternatively, the region
an individual lives in, such a happiness function has been estimated for British data over the
period 1991-96, again keeping all other influences constant (Clark 2000). As in virtually all
previous studies, the unemployed are much more dissatisfied than people with a job, and the
general level of unemployment lowers happiness. In contrast, the unemployed indeed suffer
less when a larger proportion of partners, or other people living in their region, are also out of
work. The same result is reached when general unemployment in the economy is taken as the
point of reference (Kelvin and Jarrett 1985).
Unemployed people’s well-being, moreover, depends on the strength of the social norm to
work. Social interaction of unemployed people with other community members, their forced
reference group, has the effect of showing them how they are expected to behave, and norm-
conforming behavior is enforced through social sanctions. In an estimation across Swiss
communities, it has been shown that the stronger the social norm to live off one’s own14
income, the lower is unemployed people’s reported satisfaction with life (Stutzer and Lalive
2000).
Reference groups are certainly of major importance for showing the extent to which people
are distressed by their own unemployment. However, what group one refers to is not given,
but can to some extent be chosen (Falk and Knell 2000). People out of work tend to associate
with other people out of work, partly because they have time to do so, or partly because they
retreat from community life. It is also known that marriages and partnerships have a high risk
of breaking down when one of the partners is unemployed. In all these cases, the definition of
the reference group adjusts to one’s labor market status. Causation then does not run
unambiguously from the reference group to the evaluation of unemployment in terms of
happiness.
5  Inflation
5.1  The Conventional View
Economics starts from the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated inflation when
analyzing how inflation affects individuals. Adjustment is the more costly the higher is the
variability in aggregate inflation and in relative prices caused by an increase in inflation.
People then must invest a lot of effort to inform themselves about, and to insulate themselves
from, the expected price rises. They may make many different errors, for instance
underestimating the extent of future inflation, or how a particular price changes in comparison
with other prices.
Depending on a set of rather restrictive assumptions, the welfare costs of rising prices can be
captured by computing the appropriate area under the money demand curve, the basic idea
being that economizing on the use of currency imposes costs in terms of well-being. They are
reflected indirectly by the demand for money curve. Based on this method, the cost of a ten
percent yearly inflation has been calculated to be between 0.3 percent and 0.45 percent of
national income (Fischer 1981, Lucas 1981). This is very little and suggests that an anti-
inflationary policy rarely is worth the cost it entails in terms of additional unemployment and
real income loss.
But many economists would strongly disagree with this conclusion. They point out that stable
prices are a crucial prerequisite for a sound economy in which suppliers and demanders can
act rationally. Most economists take an intermediate position, not least because the picture
emerging from the existing empirical evidence on the costs of inflation is far from clear.
There is no convincing evidence that a higher rate of anticipated inflation leads to a higher
variability in aggregate inflation or in relative prices. Neither is there strong econometric
evidence that higher unanticipated inflation makes inflation more unpredictable or that it
causes higher price variability (see the survey by Drifill, Mizon and Ulph 1990). The
“common opinion” among academic economists probably is that a rampant inflation is very
dangerous for the economy while a constant, and hence predictable, but low inflation (say 1-5
percent per year) is not taken to cause any major problems.15
The population seems to feel quite differently. A careful and extensive survey in the United
States, Germany and Brazil (Shiller 1997) finds that people are concerned about quite
different issues connected with inflation than are economists. People seem to disregard that
inflation probably also raises their own nominal income. They obviously concentrate on the
possible harm, but not on the possible benefits, of inflation on their standard of living.
Experiments (Shafir, Diamond and Tversky 1997) also suggest that people derive satisfaction
mainly from the size of their nominal rather than real income, which is a form of “money
illusion”. In addition to this psychic effect of inflation, the survey identified other concerns
generally neglected by economists. One is that inflation allows opportunists to exploit others
in an unfair and dishonest way; another is that inflation undermines the moral basis of society.
Many fear that inflation produces political and economic chaos and a loss in national prestige
due to the falling exchange rate.
5.2  Inflation Depresses Happiness
An analysis of happiness data allows us to go beyond the a priori notions of theoretical
economics. They also have a decisive advantage over surveys where people are asked directly
how they feel about inflation. It may well be that the corresponding questions trigger the
reactions which people might not have otherwise. Happiness data are collected independently
and are only afterwards linked to actual inflation experiences.
In combined time series cross section studies, the development of inflation in several
countries over the course of time can be analyzed. Of most interest is the study of 12
European countries over the period 1975-91 (Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald 1999). The
mean rate of inflation was 7.5 percent per year. Based on an econometric estimate, which
keeps all other influences including income and unemployment constant, an increase in the
inflation rate by one percentage point – say from the mean rate of 8 to 9 percent per year - is
calculated to reduce average happiness by 0.01 “units” of satisfaction, i.e. from an average
level in the sample of 3.02 to 3.01. (Average satisfaction is calculated from a cardinal
interpretation of the 4-item scale that attributes “not at all satisfied” a value of 1, “not very
satisfied” a value of 2 etc.) Correspondingly, an increase in the inflation rate by 5 percent
(which historically is a quite likely event) reduces subjective well-being by 0.05 units. This is
a substantial effect. It means that 5 percent of the population are shifted downwards from one
life satisfaction category to the next lower one, e.g. from being “very satisfied” to “fairly
satisfied”.
It is also possible to calculate the dollar cost of inflation if the effect on well-being of inflation
is compared to the effect of aggregate income per capita. As a higher real GDP per capita of $
1000 increases average satisfaction by 0.06, an inflation rate 5 percentage points higher would
have to be compensated by about $ 850 in additional income per year (in 1985 US dollars)
(Di Tella et al. 1999, p. 9).
5.3  Trade-off between Inflation and Unemployment
The results reported in the last section on the effect of unemployment on happiness, and the
results concerning inflation just discussed, can now be combined (Di Tella et al. 2001). The16
question is by how much, on average, must a country reduce its inflation in order to tolerate a
rise of one percentage point in unemployment? Over the relevant range, happiness is assumed
to depend linearly on the two economic factors, and the estimate controls for country fixed-
effects, year effects and country-specific time trends. It is calculated that a one percentage
point increase in the unemployment rate is compensated for by a 1.7 percentage point
decrease in inflation. Thus, if unemployment rises by five percentage points (say from 3 to 8
percent), the inflation rate must decrease by 8.5 percentage points (say from 10 to 1.5 percent
per year) to keep the population equally satisfied. The so-called “Misery Index”, which
simply adds the rate of unemployment to the rate of inflation, distorts the picture by
attributing too little weight to the effect of unemployment, relative to inflation, on self-
reported happiness.
6  Institutional Effects on Happiness
6.1  Type of Democracy
People’s happiness is influenced by the kind of political system they live in. It is to be
expected that people living in constitutional democracies are happier because the politicians
are more motivated to rule according to their interests. If they disregard the wishes of the
population, the politicians and parties in a democracy fail to be reelected and lose their power.
Democratic institutions, in particular the right to participate in elections and vote on issues,
thus contributes to citizens’ happiness.
Researchers on happiness have looked at the interaction of democracy with happiness. The
extent to which a constitution is democratic and allows its citizens to take decisions according
to their own preferences can be captured by various indices of freedom.
Figure 8.1 presents a graphical representation of a comprehensive measure of freedom,
combined with a 4-item measure of happiness, in 38 mainly developed nations at the
beginning of the 1990s (Veenhoven 2000a). A visual test reveals that freedom (horizontal
axis) and happiness (vertical axis) are positively related.
Figure 6 about here
The comprehensive index of the constitutional set-up used in this figure has been captured in
the following three areas:
!  Political freedom measures the possibility of citizens to engage in the democratic process
or, conversely, the restrictions on political participation. It is composed of two sub
indices, the first relating to civil rights, such as freedom of speech (with 11 items), and the
second to political rights (9 items).
!  Economic freedom measures the opportunity for individuals to engage in the free
exchange of goods, services and labor. It is based on sub indices (each in turn composed17
of a number of items), referring to the security of money, free enterprise, freedom from
excessive taxation and the possibility of undertaking monetary transfers.
!  Personal freedom measures how free one is in one’s private life, for example, to practice
one’s religion, to travel or to get married.
To combine the sub indices, average z-scores are calculated. All three - political, economic
and personal freedom - are strongly and statistically significantly correlated with happiness
(Veenhoven 2000). Controlling for differences in per capita income, the correlation with
economic, but not political and personal, freedom remains statistically significant. In contrast,
no correlation could be found between freedom and happiness in developing countries (Lane
2000, p. 265-6).
Such studies are certainly illuminating, but they can only inform us in a limited way about the
influence of various constitutional conditions on subjective well-being. One reason is that not
too much faith should be put on the comparability of happiness measures across nations.
Countries differ from each other in many ways, and it is not sufficient just to control for
unequal per capita incomes to capture the influence of democracy. Moreover, the meaning of
happiness may significantly differ between countries, so that it is questionable whether large
scale international comparisons of happiness should be undertaken at all. Finally, the cross-
section studies only report correlations and do not deal with causation. Even if we ignore the
other problems, it remains open whether democracy fosters happiness, or whether happiness
is a precondition for democracy. It has been argued, for instance, that high satisfaction with
life in a population increases the legitimacy of the political regime installed and it may thus
foster democracy (Inglehart 1990, 1999).
In the following, we therefore concentrate on specific institutions of democracy in one
particular country.
6.2  Referenda
The possibility of citizens to directly participate in politics is an important feature of
democracy. The constitutions of many countries allow popular referenda, but they are
sometimes only used as a device to inform the government when it no longer knows what to
do. Often it is used as a plebiscite in which the voters are asked to support the government’s
policy. In many cases, it is restricted to local and sometimes trivial issues while the decisions
on important issues are reserved for the professional political actors in parliament and
government. In the United States, there are many popular referenda at the local level as well
as in some states (especially in California), but the constitution does not allow them at the
national level. The only country with an extensive set of direct political participation rights at
all levels of government, and with respect to all issues, is Switzerland. Of the roughly 500
referenda made in all countries in the world at the national level between 1793 and 1978, 300
or 60 percent were held in Switzerland (see Butler and Ranney 1994).
A referendum in which all the citizens have the possibility to participate meets the crucial
requirement that it gives decision-making power to people outside the group of (professional)
politicians. The constitutional setting determines to a large extent what issues are put on the
political  agenda,  and what issues are prevented from appearing. In representative18
democracies, politicians are often very skillful not to let those problems, which are to their
disadvantage, be discussed in the democratically legitimized institutions. For example, they
usually succeed not to have their privileges (e.g. their income and pensions) discussed in open
parliamentary sessions. In direct democracies, however, in which the citizens may put any
issue to the ballot, the agenda is much less under the control of the classe politique.
The effect of direct democracy on various aspects of society has been carefully analyzed in a
number of econometric studies for the United States:
!  Government expenditure and government revenues are lower in institutions of direct
democracy (Matsusaka 1995);
!  Per capita dept is substantially lower with a referendum requiring a qualified majority
(McEachern 1978);
!  Land prices are higher because people find it attractive to live and work in such
communes (Santerre 1986);
!  Public expenditures for education are higher when a referendum is possible (Santerre
1989; 1993).
The following insights have been gained on the basis of econometric studies for Switzerland:
!  A comparison of Swiss communes with different degrees of institutionalized forms of
participation in political decisions reveals that the outcomes correspond more closely to
the voters' preferences the more directly democratic they are (Pommerehne 1990);
!  The growth of public expenditure is more strongly determined by demand factors (i.e. by
the citizens' willingness to pay) than by supply factors (in particular by the politicians' and
bureaucrats' own interests) (Pommerehne and Schneider 1978);
!  Public supply is the less costly, the more direct the democratic institutions are
(Pommerehne 1978);
!  Tax morale is higher than in representative democracies (Pommerehne and Weck-
Hannemann 1996, Frey 1997);
!  Per capita incomes in cantons with more strongly developed direct participation
possibilities of the citizens are significantly higher than in cantons with less developed
forms of direct participation (Feld and Savioz 1997).
All these results control for a great number of variables unrelated to direct democracy. They
provide strong evidence that the deviations from the citizens' preferences are indeed
significantly lower in a referendum compared to a representative democracy.
The influence of direct democracy on happiness has been analyzed using data on reported
subjective well-being for Switzerland in 1992-1994 (Frey and Stutzer 2000).  The major
explanatory variable is the institutionalised right of individual political participation via
popular referenda, which varies considerably between the 26 Swiss cantons. The estimates
reveal that the extent of direct democratic participation possibilities exerts a statistically
significant, robust and sizeable effect on happiness over and above the demographic and
economic determinants normally taken into account. When the full variation in the19
institutional variable is considered, i.e. when individuals in the canton with the highest
democracy index (Basel Land) are compared to citizens in the canton with the lowest direct
participation rights (Geneva), the former state with an 11 percentage points higher probability
that they are completely satisfied. This effect is larger than living in the top rather than in the
bottom income category.
6.3  Federalism
The decentralization of decision making is an alternative means for better fulfillment of the
voters' preferences: individuals tend to leave dissatisfying jurisdictions while they are
attracted to those caring for the population's preferences at low cost. The possibility to vote
with one's feet (Tiebout 1956; see also Buchanan 1965, Hirschman 1970) tends to undermine
regional cartels by politicians. The division of competence between communities and the
cantonal government, or the extent of fiscal decentralization, is thus another constitutional
factor systematically influencing happiness. In the study for Switzerland mentioned above
(Frey and Stutzer 2000), the extent of local autonomy is measured by an index based on
survey results. Chief local administrators in 1,856 Swiss municipalities were asked to report
how they perceive their local autonomy on a 10 point scale.
The estimate reveals a statistically significant positive effect of decentralization on subjective
well-being. For local autonomy, the proportion of persons who indicate being completely
satisfied with life increases by 3.3 percentage points, compared to a situation in which the
communes are one index point less autonomous vis-à-vis their canton.
7  Consequences
7.1  Economic Policy Advice
The insights gained about happiness are in many respects useful for economic policy
undertaken by governments. Some examples suffice to illustrate the point:
!  An important part of anti-poverty policy deals with the question of what “poverty” is.
Traditionally, the definition relies on disposable income. Happiness research allows the
problem to be approached more fundamentally by considering reported satisfaction levels.
Such complementary measurement also allows equivalence scales to be established
(Schwarze 2000). They indicate the increase in income necessary to compensate for a
larger family, while maintaining the subjective well-being of the family.
!  Welfare policy is faced with the question of how much economic destitution is responsible
for persons feeling unhappy. To what extent can persons with low income be helped by
financial support? If low income is due to unemployment, the research results suggest that
not much is achieved by providing the person with a higher income. Rather, the policy
should be directed towards providing the person with appropriate employment.
!  The use of measures of happiness allows for a new way of evaluating the effects of
government expenditure. All too often, the effect is measured by the cost incurred by the
state: the more spent, the better. This is obviously not always the case, and in some20
instances lower expenditure would be better. The problem has been approached
scientifically by using benefit-cost analysis. The benefits are the recipients’ marginal
willingness to pay, which is best measured by a Contingent Valuation analysis (see
Carson et al. 1994 who list almost 1,700 studies in over 40 countries). This method relies
on carefully designed surveys in which the persons are put into a quasi-experimental
situation (Arrow et al. 1993). This method is best suited to relatively small and isolated
public projects, but it breaks down when it comes to more extensive expenditure policies.
Simulations using micro-econometric happiness functions with a large number of
determinants may be better able to evaluate the widespread effects of such policies.
!  Tax policy must consider to what extent various income groups are affected. Is it possible
to achieve social goals by redistributing income, or are the negative effects on subjective
well-being prohibitive? Recently, it has been argued that the fight for relative positions is
socially wasteful, and that the high income recipients, as winners of these status races,
should be more heavily taxed (Frank 1999, more generally Layard 1980). This proposal
has been influenced by the findings of happiness research, which suggest that people
derive more satisfaction from their position in comparison to other income recipients than
from the income level as such. If the redistributive tax policy is able to maintain income
rankings, but reduces the absolute differences between income recipients, subjective well-
being is little affected, and presumably work incentives are not reduced. But for an overall
evaluation, this proposal must consider many additional aspects, in particular what
possibilities the high income recipients have to avoid increased taxes.
A widespread temptation is to consider happiness functions as the best existing approximation
to a social welfare function, and to maximize them. The optimal values of the determinants
thus derived are – according to this view – the goals which economic policy should achieve. It
seems that, at long last, the so far empirically empty social welfare maximization of the
quantitative theory of economic policy (Tinbergen 1956, Theil 1964) is given a new lease of
life.
This is exactly how the influential paper by Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001)
proceeds. They open their paper with the following statement: „Modern macroeconomics
textbooks rest upon the assumption of a social welfare function defined on inflation, π , and
unemployment, U. However, no formal evidence for the existence of such a function has ever
been presented in literature. Although an optimal policy rule cannot be chosen unless the
parameters of the presumed W (π , U) function are known, that has not prevented its use in a
large theoretical literature in macroeconomics“ (p. 1; without footnotes).
Such an endeavor overlooks some fundamental problems in the social welfare maximization
approach (Frey 1983, p. 182-194). Only one shortcoming, empirical emptiness, has been
overcome (provided one is prepared to accept happiness functions as a reasonable
approximation to a social welfare function). Two other basic shortcomings remain, namely
the problems of preference aggregation and missing incentives. Since Arrow (1951), it has
been known that, under a number of „reasonable“ conditions, no social welfare function exists
that generally ranks outcomes consistently, except a dictatorship. This impossibility result
spawned a huge amount of literature (called Social Choice), analyzing its robustness to
modifications of the assumptions. Theorem after theorem demonstrated that almost all21
changes in the axiomatic structure left the dictatorial result unchanged (see e.g. Sen 1995,
Slesnick 1998). It must be concluded that „there is no way we can use empirical observations
on their own to produce an ethically satisfactory cardinalization, let alone an ethically
satisfactory social welfare ordering“ (Hammond 1991, p. 220-21). This verdict applies to
happiness functions if they are used as quasi social welfare functions.
The second problem refers to the missing incentives. Deriving optimal policies by
maximizing a social welfare function only makes sense if the government has an incentive to
apply the optimal policies in reality. This is only the case if a „benevolent dictator“
government is assumed (Brennan and Buchanan 1985). Empirical analyses in Public Choice
(see for example Mueller 1997) suggest that governments are not benevolent and do not
simply follow the wishes of the population, even in well-functioning democracies, not to
mention authoritarian and dictatorial governments. Hence, to maximize social welfare
corresponds to a 'technocratic-elitist' procedure, neglecting the crucial incentive aspect.
Constitutional Political Economy (e.g. Buchanan 1991, Mueller 1996, Cooter 2000) redirects
attention to the level of the social consensus where, behind the veil of ignorance, the basic
rules governing a society – the fundamental institutions – are chosen or emerge. At the same
time, the approach shifts from a (vain) effort to directly determine social outcomes to shaping
the politico-economic process by setting adequate constitutional provisions.
Research on happiness has identified two basic institutions having an important effect on
happiness, direct democracy and federalism.
7.2  Consequences for Economic Theory
The insights gained from the research on happiness throw new light on important issues
analyzed by economics. Most important, they enlarge the scope of empirical measurement
and provide new tests for theories.
Happiness is not identical to utility, but it well captures people’s satisfaction with life. For
many purposes, it can be considered a useful approximation to utility which economists have
evaded to measure (with the exception of benefit-cost analysis). This allows us to empirically
study problems which so far could only be analyzed on an abstract theoretical level.
Moreover, the analysis of data on subjective well-being may allow for discrimination between
competing explanations for empirical findings in behavior (for an application see Stutzer and
Lalive 2000). The opportunities offered by information on well-being and affect may not only
enrich field research but also laboratory research in experimental economics (see e.g.
Charness and Grosskopf 1999, Konow and Earley 1999). These extensions represent a
considerable step forward towards a social science able to provide useful information.
Happiness research adds considerable new insights to well-known theoretical propositions.
This has been shown with the example of how income, unemployment and inflation affect
reported individual well-being.
The research on happiness undertaken leaves many questions open. At the same time it opens
up challenging new areas. Further progress is especially needed in four areas:22
(1) The effects of happiness on behavior. Economists have mainly studied the effects of
behavior on subjective well-being, as represented by variables such as unemployment,
inflation and income. The reverse effect has so far received scant attention (for a
theoretical investigation see, for example, Hermalin and Isen 1999). In the following, we
present some ideas for future research that are particularly relevant from the economic
point of view. Psychologists have identified some effects of happy persons on behavior.
Happy people, for instance, are more prepared to initiate social contacts with friends; are
more inclined to respond to requests for help; are less often absent from work; and are less
likely to get involved in work disputes (Frank 1997, p. 1833).
The extent of happiness may influence many important economic decisions. Examples
are:
!  Consumption activities. Happy persons are most likely to save and spend different
proportions of their income, to distribute differently over time, and to acquire different
combinations of particular goods and services than do less happy persons (e.g. Kahn
and Isen 1993).
!  Work behavior. Happier individuals may differ significantly in behavior on the job.
There is indeed a very large literature on job satisfaction (e.g. Warr 1999) which
analyzes, for example, whether more satisfied workers are also more productive
(Iaffeldano and Muchinsky 1985).
!  Investment behavior. It can be hypothesized that happier people have a different
attitude to taking risks than less happy people. They may also prefer different markets
and types of financial investments.
!  Political behavior. Happy people are likely to vote for different politicians and parties,
and for different alternatives in referenda, than unhappy people. It has, for instance,
been found that such a difference exists where attitudes towards the European Union
are concerned (Castles 2000).
(2) Application of Happiness Analysis to Further Areas. There are many topics in economic
research for which a complementary analysis of survey data on subjective well-being
would be worthwhile. Possible questions are:
!  Evaluation of inequality. How does inequality in income as well as in wealth affect
human well-being (see e.g. Alesina et al. 2000)?
!  Discrimination of women. Is there a relationship between discrimination of women on
the labor market and their life satisfaction (see e.g. Clark 1997, Sousa-Poza and
Sousa-Poza 2000)?
!  Environmental economics. To what extent does environmental quality have an effect
on individual well-being?
!  Growth analysis. Are there systematic differences in measures of subjective well-
being for different paths of growth or development (see e.g. Kenny 1999)?
Special emphasis may be put on a broader set of institutions. Studies on the impact of
institutions on happiness have so far mainly been confined to two elements, namely23
(direct) democracy and federalism. They certainly count among the most important basic
aspects of a constitution, but there are many other institutions whose impact on subjective
well-being is worth studying. Examples would be the institutions of monetary policy, such
as the extent of independence of the central bank (see e.g. Eijffinger 1997); the
importance of corporatism in policy making (see e.g. Schneider and Wagner 2000); or the
prevalence of centralized or firm level wage bargaining between trade unions and
employer associations (see e.g. Iversen, Pontusson and Soskice 2000).
(3) Application of More Advanced Methods. Most comparative studies of happiness between
countries employ multiple cross-section regressions. This has been a very useful starting
point, but the next important step is to use panel data, that is combined cross-section time-
series analyses. The use of this technique for happiness research is only just beginning (in
particular in the work by Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald 2001), mostly because the
necessary data on happiness are still lacking.
(4) Improved Happiness Measurements. There is also room for methodological concerns and
the quality of the happiness data (e.g. Diener, Suh, Lucas and Smith 1999, p. 277-8).
Economists should, however, not be too critical, in view of the deficiencies of what they
measure and use as a matter of course. National income is a case in point. Its
shortcomings are obvious and need not be discussed here. The main use of happiness
measures is, however, not to compare levels of subjective well-being, but rather to seek to
identify the determinants of happiness.
This paper has reached its goal if it has convinced the reader that happiness research is not a
futile or eccentric activity but is able to provide relevant new insights, and can serve as an
inspiration for future research in economics.24
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FIGURE 1
LIFE SATISFACTION AND INCOME LEVELS ACROSS THE WORLD IN THE 1990S
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FIGURE 2
HAPPINESS AND INCOME PER CAPITA IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN 1946 AND 1991
Sources: World Database of Happiness, Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S.






























































POPULATION DISTRIBUTION OF HAPPINESS ACCORDING TO VARIOUS LEVELS OF INCOME,
UNITED STATES IN 1994
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FIGURE 5
INCOME AND WELL-BEING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1981-84
Source: Diener et al. (1993), figure 2 from Kluwer Academic Publishers.38
FIGURE 6
FREEDOM AND HAPPINESS ACROSS NATIONS
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